
              : confidentiality in mediation and its legal safeguards in the EU Member States by unknown
ERA Forum (2013) 14:421–435
DOI 10.1007/s12027-013-0317-9
A RT I C L E
Nihil silentio utilius: confidentiality in mediation
and its legal safeguards in the EU Member States
Rafal Morek
Published online: 1 October 2013
© The Author(s) 2013. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract While mediation is all about communication, its boundaries—in many
respects—need to be established. Confidentiality is at the heart of the mediation pro-
cess. It encourages parties to mediation to speak freely and openly. It is essential
for the success of mediation both in individual cases and as an institution—a popu-
lar dispute resolution method alternative to litigation. This article adopts a particular
focus on the confidentiality-related regulations and problems in the EU law and its
Member States. While the vast majority of European countries have complied with
the 2008 EU Mediation Directive, its requirements may be viewed as insufficient.
Article 7 of the Directive provides for a minimum degree of compatibility and very
basic standards only. While the current regulations in the Member States differ vastly,
so do the consequences of a breach of the duty and a leak of confidential information.
This leads to uncertainty and accidental results in cross-border mediations within the
EU. Such a situation is unsatisfactory and is even made worse by the fact that the
Directive allows member states to decide freely on the qualifications, requirements
and other regulations applicable to mediators. Therefore the article calls for further
harmonization to establish higher standards and greater clarity.
Keywords Mediation · Conciliation · Dispute resolution · Mediator ·
Confidentiality · Secrecy · Privilege · Evidentiary restrictions · Harmonization
The Latin inscription “Nihil silentio utilius” is sometime incorrectly translated as “Silence is
useless”. Its actual meaning is quite the opposite—“Nothing [is] more useful than silence”.
Dr. R. Morek, Assistant Professor, Advocate, Mediator (B)




The proverb “Reden ist Silber, Schweigen is Gold” (Speech is silver, silence is golden)
fits well into the context of mediation. While mediation is all about communication,
its boundaries—in many respects—need to be established. Confidentiality is at the
heart of the mediation process. It encourages parties to mediation to speak freely and
openly. This is because they must not fear (or at least fear much less) that their words
may be used against them when revealed to an outsider to the mediation process, such
as a judge in a court or a market competitor.
Confidentiality is essential for the success of mediation both in individual cases
and as an institution—a popular dispute resolution method alternative to litigation.1
While state court proceedings are in principle open to the public in most jurisdictions,
the rule of mediation is opposite. It is a private procedure by nature. And its private
character encompasses, among other things, confidentiality and secrecy. Confiden-
tiality is therefore considered a key principle of mediation, or even an essential part
of its definition.2
Empirical studies show that the confidentiality of the mediation process is valued
by its users.3 It has also been became “the centerpiece of conciliation [mediation]
regime”,4 including both modern mediation laws and mediation rules, as well as
norms other than legal, such as codes of conduct or mediator’s ethics.5 On the other
hand, from a global transnational and intercultural perspective, the confidentiality
principle may be seen as a mere Western concept. In some other legal traditions, it is
a usual routine that community members may not only be observers, but also active
stakeholders taking part in the dispute resolution processes.6
This article adopts a particular focus on the confidentiality-related regulations and
problems in the EU law and its Member States. While the vast majority of European
countries have complied with the 2008 Directive, its requirements may be viewed as
1While the above opinion is shared by the majority of authors and practicing mediators, it is sometimes
challenged. For example, according to J. Reich, there is no sufficient empirical evidence indicating that
confidentiality is necessary for the success of the mediation process. He also suggested that statutory
provisions on confidentiality do not influence parties’ conduct in mediation in any significant way, as
they are rarely aware of such regulations and their implications—Reich [18]. See also Green [10], p. 2 et
sub.; Hughes [12]; Goldberg, Sander, Rogers [9], p. 442 (noting that “[l]awmakers have little evidence to
guide them in assessing whether assurance of confidentiality is necessary to promote the frank discussion
necessary to achieve settlement.”).
2See e.g. the legal definition of mediation in Article 2 of the Bulgarian Mediation Law (State
Gazette No. 110/17.12.2004, amended and supplemented, SG No. 86/24.10.2006, supplemented, SG
No. 9/28.01.2011, amended and supplemented, SG No. 27/1.04.2011): “Mediation is a voluntary and
confidential procedure for out-of-court resolution of disputes, whereby a third party mediator assists the
disputants in reaching a settlement”.
3See e.g. the survey results in the report “Mediation: Through the Eyes of New York Litigators. Report
of the Mediation Committee of the New York State Bar Association Dispute Resolution Section and The
Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee of the New York City Bar Association” (2011), www.nysba.org.
4Sekolec, Getty [20], p. 189.
5See e.g. European Code of Conduct for Mediators, points 3.1 and 4.
6See e.g. Ury [21], p. 5; Antaki [2].
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insufficient. Article 7 of the EU Directive provides for a minimum degree of compat-
ibility and very basic standards only.7 While the current regulations in the Member
States differ vastly, so do the consequences of a breach of the duty and a leak of con-
fidential information. This leads to uncertainty and accidental results in cross-border
mediations within the EU. Such a situation is unsatisfactory and is even made worse
by the fact that the Directive allows member states to decide freely on the qualifi-
cations, requirements and other regulations applicable to mediators.8 Therefore the
article calls for further harmonization to establish higher standards and greater clarity.
2 Purposes and functions of the principle of confidentiality in mediation
Before exploring more specific issues, one should ask the question as to why confi-
dentiality in mediation actually matters. What do we protect when seeking to assure
“confidentiality” in mediation? What in this respect, if anything, deserves legal or
other protection?
The EU Directive does not answer the above questions. It just states in its Preamble
that “confidentiality in the mediation process is important and this Directive should
therefore provide for a minimum degree of compatibility of civil procedural rules with
regard to how to protect the confidentiality of mediation in any subsequent civil and
commercial judicial proceedings or arbitration” (Recital 23).9
Beyond the Directive, the 2002 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Conciliation has been seen as a set of universal (global) standards for medi-
ation regulations. Even if the Model Law had not become a huge success in terms of
the number of jurisdictions where it was adopted,10 it remains a key point of reference
for drafters of mediation laws. It is indisputable that no other juridical instrument ex-
ists with a comprehensive set of mediation rules adopted under the aegis of the United
Nations or any other organization with a global reach.
7This results explicitly from the Directive itself, which describes its regulation in Article 7(1) by refer-
ring to “a minimum degree of compatibility” (Recital 23), and declares in Article 7(2) that “nothing in
paragraph 1 shall preclude Member States from enacting stricter measures to protect the confidentiality
of mediation.”
8Those two issues, i.e. safeguards of confidentiality and the legal and professional status of a mediator,
are closely interrelated. The link is relevant, among other things, in the context of liability for a mediator’s
breach of confidentiality duty as well as the parties’ trust that confidentiality will be respected. As set out in
the Directive’s Preamble (Recital 16): “To ensure the necessary mutual trust with respect to confidentiality
(. . .), Member States should encourage, by any means they consider appropriate, the training of media-
tors and the introduction of effective quality control mechanisms concerning the provision of mediation
services.”
9According to the Green Paper released by the European Commission in 2004: “[c]onfidentiality appears
to be the key to the success of ADR because it helps guarantee the frankness of the parties and the sincerity
of the communications exchanged in the course of the procedure”—Green Paper on Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Civil and Commercial Law, COM/2002/0196 final, p. 29.
10According to the UNCITRAL Secretariat, legislation based on the Model Law has been adopted in
the following jurisdictions: Albania (2011), Belgium (2005), the Canadian provinces of Nova Scotia
(2005) and Ontario (2010), Croatia (2003), France (2011), Honduras (2000), Hungary (2002), Luxem-
bourg (2012), Montenegro (2005), Nicaragua (2005), Slovenia (2008), Switzerland (2008), The former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2009) and in twelve states in the US.
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The Official Guide to UNCITRAL Model Law identifies the goals that led its
drafters. One of them is “to promote frank and open discussions of parties by ensuring
confidentiality of the process, limiting disclosure of certain information and facts
raised in the conciliation in other subsequent proceedings subject only to the need for
disclosure required by law or for the purposes of implementation or enforcement”.11
The promotion of open communication has also been a leitmotiv in numerous
publications on the subject matter. It is argued that without the adequate safeguards of
confidentiality, parties to a dispute would be reluctant to disclose information needed
to find a settlement. No shrewd party or attorney would present information that could
later be used against him at trial. As a result, many valuable opportunities (including
those related to outcomes of the process, as well as time, cost, reputation, relationship,
etc.) offered by mediation would be lost. Frank and open discussion is a cornerstone
on which a mediator may assist parties to make a “shift from positions to interests”
and engage them in a conversation on a whole range of possible solutions to their
dispute. It is also essential to rationality in negotiations.12
All those advantages would be frustrated if the parties had to fear that information
disclosed in mediation could be used to their prejudice in subsequent legal proceed-
ings. The parties would less willing to consider different options if they fear that their
proposals may be taken as a concession and held against them in litigation or arbitra-
tion. Mediation conducted without confidentiality protections could also be abused
as a self-standing process. To quote N. Alexander: it would “invite fishing expeditions
with good catches to be made by opportunistic negotiators at the expense of vulnera-
ble parties such as those that are unrepresented”.13 Hence confidentiality, if solidly
protected, should increase the parties’ willingness to engage in mediation.
Confidentiality is also said to enhance the effectiveness of dispute resolution in
other ways. It is related to the informal nature of mediation, which avoids much of
the time and costs that would be involved in formal documentation, necessary to
allow for appellate or other similar procedures. Confidentiality is linked with lim-
ited grounds of judicial review of mediated settlements and the mediation process
as such. Therefore, as noted by N. Alexander, “confidentiality of the mediation pro-
cess (. . .) affords it a considerable level of procedural finality, even if no settlement is
reached”.14
3 Dimensions of confidentiality in mediation
What does confidentiality of mediation actually mean? Confidentiality is a multi-
faceted concept. From the structural perspective its internal (among mediation partic-
ipants) and external (vis-à-vis third parties) dimensions can be distinguished.
11Official Guide to UNCITRAL Model Law, General principles upon which the Model Law is based,
p. 41.
12Brazil [3].
13Alexander [1], p. 246.
14Ibidem.
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The internal dimension regulates flows of information within mediation. It be-
comes relevant when a mediator uses caucusing, i.e. private sessions with individual
parties. A mediator can manage the “internal confidentiality” in one of two ways:
by adopting the “open communication” approach or the “in-confidence” approach.15
The former assumes that no information is confidential to the other participants in
mediation, unless specifically restricted by the relevant parties. The latter operates
in a converse manner by treating all information disclosed privately as confidential
unless the disclosing party indicates otherwise. Each model has its pros and cons.16
While there are no grounds to find any of them inadmissible, it is essential for the
integrity of the mediation process that a mediator declare explicitly which model is
to be applied in a given case.
The external dimension relates to confidentiality towards third parties, i.e. “out-
siders” to the mediation process. It forbids the participants from disclosing informa-
tion from the mediation to non-participants, unless a given disclosure is permitted
under subjective or objective exceptions to the confidentiality principle.17 A specific
subcategory of the external dimension of confidentiality relates to a court or an arbi-
tral tribunal, and the disclosing of the information from the mediation in a subsequent
litigation or arbitration proceeding.
The distinction between the internal and external dimensions of confidentiality in
mediation exists e.g. in the European Code of Conduct for Mediators, which regulates
both in a brief manner in the two following sentences of its Point 4:
The mediator must keep confidential all information arising out of or in
connection with the mediation, including the fact that the mediation is to take
place or has taken place, unless compelled by law or grounds of public policy
to disclose it. Any information disclosed in confidence to mediators by one of
the parties must not be disclosed to the other parties without permission, unless
compelled by law.
The internal (based on the “open communication” approach) and external dimensions
of confidentiality are also addressed in the UNCITRAL Model Law:18
Article 8 (Disclosure of information)
When the conciliator receives information concerning the dispute from a
party, the conciliator may disclose the substance of that information to any
other party to the conciliation. However, when a party gives any information to
15Ibidem, p. 248.
16Mediators who prefer the “open communication” approach usually argue that a free flow of information
and the principle that no secrets should be kept by the mediator are essential for building trust in mediation.
The proponents of the alternative model indicate that it is more effective: the parties are more likely to
disclose the information to a mediator if they assume that it will remain confidential, unless they expressly
authorize a mediator to disclose it to the other party. See a detailed discussion on that issue in Alexander
[1], pp. 249–250.
17See comments in Sect. 7.
18In Europe, similar regulation is included e.g. in Article 10 of the Slovenian Mediation in Civil and
Commercial Matters Act (ZMCGZ). In turn, for example, the Italian Decree 28/2010, Article 9(2), is
based “in-confidence” approach.
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the conciliator, subject to a specific condition that it be kept confidential, that
information shall not be disclosed to any other party to the conciliation.
Article 9 (Confidentiality)
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, all information relating to the con-
ciliation proceedings shall be kept confidential, except where disclosure is re-
quired under the law or for the purposes of implementation or enforcement of
a settlement agreement. (. . .)
The regulation of confidentiality in the EU Directive is in turn limited to the “in-
sider/court” relation only.
Article 7 (Confidentiality of mediation)
1. Given that mediation is intended to take place in a manner which respects
confidentiality, Member States shall ensure that, unless the parties agree oth-
erwise, neither mediators nor those involved in the administration of the me-
diation process shall be compelled to give evidence in civil and commercial
judicial proceedings or arbitration regarding information arising out of or in
connection with a mediation process, except:
(a) where this is necessary for overriding considerations of public policy of
the Member State concerned, in particular when required to ensure the pro-
tection of the best interests of children or to prevent harm to the physical or
psychological integrity of a person; or
(b) where disclosure of the content of the agreement resulting from media-
tion is necessary in order to implement or enforce that agreement.
2. Nothing in paragraph 1 shall preclude Member States from enacting
stricter measures to protect the confidentiality of mediation.
The Directive remains silent not only on the internal, but also on all other aspects
of the external dimension, i.e. disclosures outside litigation or arbitration proceed-
ings. All the above issues have been left to the discretion of the Member States.
The brevity of the Directive’s norms on confidentiality is reflected by the fact that
the Directive does not actually impose an express duty to keep information from the
mediation confidential. However, such an obligation can be inferred—in relation to
the mediator—by way of interpretation of the provisions of the Directive.19
4 Who is obliged to respect confidentiality in mediation?
Even if the mediation procedure is not public, a group of people may gain access
to what is discussed therein. This group includes: parties, mediators, legal advisers,
experts consulted, judges involved (in judicial or court-annexed mediation) as well as
auxiliary staff of all these persons (secretarial staff, assistants, translators,20 etc.).
19Henke [11], p. 29.
20On the need to extend the safeguards concerning confidentiality of mediation communications to include
such staff—see e.g. “Guide to Good Practice under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction. Mediation”, Hague Conference on Private International Law
2012, para. 77.
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Under the EU Directive, the group of individuals obliged to respect confidential-
ity is much narrower and encompasses only “mediators [and] those involved in the
administration of the mediation process” (Article 7(1)). The parties to mediation are
not (at least not expressly) bound by the confidentiality-related obligations under the
Directive.21 Such regulatory policy raises significant doubts. The most relevant dan-
gers for confidentiality do not originate from the mediator (in particular as a potential
witness in judicial proceedings), but from the parties themselves. In most cases, they
just do not need a mediator, but can act on their own, to introduce the information
from the mediation process into subsequent litigation or arbitration in their pleadings
or documentary evidence.22
The UNCITRAL Model Law adopts a much broader approach than the Directive.
Not only does it encompass the parties to a mediation process among those obliged
to respect confidentiality (“a party to the conciliation proceedings, the conciliator
and any third person, including those involved in the administration of the concili-
ation proceedings”—Article 10(1)), but even lists them in the first place, before the
mediator.
Many national mediation laws have followed the same direction. For example,
in Bulgaria, the relevant obligation applies to all “participants in a mediation pro-
cess”.23 In the 2011 Croatian Mediation Law, while the core regulation in Arti-
cle 14(1) and (2) is addressed to a mediator, the same rules “apply accordingly to
the parties and other persons who have participated in mediation proceedings in any
capacity” (Article 14(3)). However, it is not the case in all the Member States. In
Poland, for example, explicit legal safeguards of confidentiality in mediation apply
to the mediator only (Article 183[4] of the Civil Procedure Code).
5 What information is protected against disclosure under the confidentiality
principle?
Confidentiality may extend to different communications and kinds of information
within the mediation process, including e.g.: factual statements, concessions, offers
and other information shared by parties in a joint session, information provided to
the mediator in a private session or in a phone call or email, documents created or
prepared for the purposes of mediation, the mediator’s notes, the mediator’s observa-
tions on the behavior and conduct of participants in mediation, or on the reasons for
failure to reach agreement at mediation.24
The UNCITRAL Model Law, when stating the general obligation of confidential-
ity in Article 9 (Confidentiality), relates to “all information relating to the concilia-
tion proceedings”. In addition, with respect to the issue of inadmissibility of evidence
21Henke [11], p. 29. M. Marinari reported that a similar wording in the Article 9 of the Italian Decree
28/2010 caused concerns related to uncertainty as to whether it applies to the parties in the dispute Mari-
nari [14].
22Eidenmüller, Prause [8], p. 2741.
23Article 7 (1).
24Reichert [19], p. 62.
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in subsequent litigation or arbitration, Article 10(1) lists, in a detailed manner, the fol-
lowing categories of communications:
(a) An invitation by a party to engage in conciliation proceedings or the fact
that a party was willing to participate in conciliation proceedings;
(b) Views expressed or suggestions made by a party in the conciliation in
respect of a possible settlement of the dispute;
(c) Statements or admissions made by a party in the course of the concilia-
tion proceedings;
(d) Proposals made by the conciliator;
(e) The fact that a party had indicated its willingness to accept a proposal
for settlement made by the conciliator;
(f) A document prepared solely for purposes of the conciliation proceedings.
A similar list had been envisaged in the draft EU Directive of 2004.25 Finally, how-
ever, the Directive’s provisions were to a great degree shortened and watered down.
Its confidentiality regulation, i.e. the evidentiary exclusion in Article 7(1) of the Di-
rective, relates to the general category of “information arising out of or in connection
with a mediation process”.26 Most national mediation laws in the EU Member States
also use broad terms such as “any and all data and information obtained in a me-
diation process”27 or “die Tatsachen, die im Rahmen der Mediation anvertraut oder
sonst bekannt wurden”28), and avoid listing specific examples of communications
protected under the mediation privilege.
Further, the Directive does not explicitly protect documentary evidence related to
mediation. In several Member States its Article 7(1) (“(. . .) mediators (. . .) shall [not]
be compelled to give evidence”) has been implemented in the form of an evidentiary
restriction related to hearing the mediator as a witness (testimonial evidence).29 Un-
der the Italian Decree 28/2010, uncertainty about protection of documentary evidence
has been referred to as a “troubling issue”.30
When regulating the scope of confidential information, policymakers need to take
into account, inter alia, the two following premises. On the one hand, there is a need
to cover the various means of storing and transferring information, as well as the
different types of communications within the mediation process. This goal may be
satisfied by the use of spacious legal formulas, like the ones referred to above. On the
other hand, however, one should avoid the risk of creating an incentive that one party
agrees to mediation only in order to block information and evidence in subsequent
litigation and arbitration.
25Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects of mediation in
civil and commercial matters {SEC(2004) 1314}, Brussels, 22.10.2004, COM(2004) 718 final, 2004/0251
(COD), Article 6.
26Subject to the exceptions presented in Sect. 7 below.
27Hungarian Act LV of 2002 on Mediation, Sect. 26.
28Austrian Zivilrechts-Mediations-Gesetz (ZivMediatG), Sect. 18.
29See detailed comments in Sect. 6.4.
30Marinari [14], p. 191.
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The UNCITRAL Model Law attempted to tackle the latter problem in Arti-
cle 10(5):
Subject to the limitations of paragraph 1 of this article, evidence that is oth-
erwise admissible in arbitral or judicial or similar proceedings does not become
inadmissible as a consequence of having been used in a conciliation.
Both the Directive and most national mediation laws in the Member States31 are silent
on the above issue.
6 How confidentiality of mediation is protected?
6.1 General remarks
The confidentiality duties may arise from different sources. So do the measures of
protection and remedies. As noted above, the Directive provides only for a single
mandatory measure, i.e. the evidentiary exclusion in Article 7(1), and grants the
Member States the liberty to introduce stricter instruments of protection. A review
of mediation regulations presents a wide array of alternative or additional solutions.
It also leads to the conclusion that the standards of confidentiality protection in the
EU Member States differ vastly. Lack of coherence and related uncertainty do not
serve well to the promotion of cross-border mediation practice in Europe.
6.2 Contract
While the European standard set forth in the Directive is clearly insufficient, a con-
tract (in particular a mediation agreement) has often been seen as a primary source of
confidentiality duty and safeguards. This approach is reflected e.g. in the European
Code of Conduct for Mediators (point 3.1), which reads as follows:
The mediator must in particular ensure that prior to commencement of the
mediation the parties have understood and expressly agreed the terms and con-
ditions of the mediation agreement including any applicable provisions relating
to obligations of confidentiality on the mediator and on the parties.
However, contractual safeguards of confidentiality have their limits and drawbacks.
Firstly, from the policymaking perspective, it is questionable whether a contract-
focused model of protection is appropriate and sufficient, in particular in matters
other than commercial or for those parties who act without the representation of a
professional attorney. Secondly, contractual evidentiary exclusions may be ineffective
vis-à-vis some public law regulations, such as state court procedures. For example,
in most jurisdictions, a contractual confidentiality obligation will not give a media-
tor the privilege to refuse to testify and provide evidence in criminal proceedings. In
all instances where criminal proceedings law holds that the state itself (acting e.g.
31However, for example, in Denmark, “information which is otherwise available to the public” is expressly
exempted from the confidentiality principle—Danish Administration of Justice Act, Clause 277.
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through a public prosecutor), and not e.g. the injured party, must establish the facts
of the case at hand, contractual arrangements inter partes are simply irrelevant.32
6.3 Implied agreement
In the jurisprudence of some countries the doctrine of “implied agreement” has been
proposed. It comes into play when the parties had earlier failed to conclude an explicit
mediation contract (or failed to cover all the relevant issues therein), and there are no
statutory laws to fill the gap. According to this concept, by entering into a mediation
process, the parties impliedly agree to accept its fundamental principles, including
confidentiality. Thus they enter into an implied agreement on confidentiality.
6.4 Evidence and submission restrictions in law
The basic standard envisaged in Article 7(1) of the Directive has been implemented
and developed in national mediation laws.33 They provide for different approaches to
evidence restrictions (leading to the inadmissibility of certain evidentiary materials),
such as the prohibition on calling a mediator to testify, right for witnesses (in partic-
ular mediators, legal advisers and other involved third parties) of refusal to testify in
general or with respect to some specified subject matters.
In parallel to the mediation privilege, some other traditional evidentiary restric-
tions may come into play in the context of mediation in individual cases, such as
legal professional privilege, privilege against self-incrimination, marital privilege, or
public interest privilege.34 In common-law countries, confidentiality in mediation is
protected by the “without prejudice” privilege, which was originally developed in
relation to settlement negotiation.35
Similar to the evidentiary constraints discussed above are submission restrictions
applicable to a party and/or its counsel. For example, under Polish law, revealing in-
formation about settlement proposals, mutual concessions, or other statements made
in mediation to the court or an arbitration tribunal is ineffective, meaning that such in-
formation should not be taken into account when making a judgment (Article 183[4]
§3 CCP).
32This is the case e.g. in Germany—see Ch. Duve, Lessons learnt from the implementation of the EU
Mediation Directive in Germany: the point of view of lawyers, Brussels 2011, www.europarl.europa.eu/
studies, p. 8.
33Its direct equivalent in the UNCITRAL Model Law may be identified in its Article 10(1): “A party to the
conciliation proceedings, the conciliator and any third person, including those involved in the administra-
tion of the conciliation proceedings, shall not in arbitral, judicial or similar proceedings rely on, introduce
as evidence or give testimony or evidence regarding (. . .)” and Article 10(3): “The disclosure of the in-
formation referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall not be ordered by an arbitral tribunal, court or
other competent governmental authority and, if such information is offered as evidence in contravention
of paragraph 1 of this article, that evidence shall be treated as inadmissible”.
34See e.g. Kirtley [13]; Miller [16].
35See e.g. Ehrhardt [6].
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6.5 Damages and restraining orders
Breach of confidentiality may also result in a claim for damages. In most cases it
would be pursued under the general rules of civil liability, be it either a contract law
claim or a tort law claim. A handful of mediation laws regulate such a remedy, in a
specific manner, in their provisions.36 One can also apply for an injunction to restrain
breach of confidence.37
6.6 Administrative or disciplinary measures
The nature of confidentiality obligations, and the consequences of mediators’ pro-
fessional malpractice, including various administrative or disciplinary measures, can
vary according to the professional affiliation of the mediators, e.g. lawyer-mediators,
notary-mediators or psychologist-mediators.38
For example, in Germany, in the absence of legislative provisions on confiden-
tiality directly applicable to mediation, the laws that govern mediators’ professional
affiliation applied before 2012. Therefore it was indicated as an advantage to having a
lawyer as a mediator that lawyers have a statutory confidentiality obligation.39 They
are by law required to keep all information confidential that they were provided with
in the course of their professional activities (§43a II of the Federal Lawyer’s Act,
Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung—BRAO). They also have the right to refuse to give
evidence in civil (§383 I Nr. 6 ZPO) and criminal proceedings (§53 I Nr. 3 Straf-
prozessordnung—StPO).
Lack of coherence and uniform standards within the emerging mediators’ profes-
sion have been (and still remain) a problem in several other Member States.
6.7 Criminal sanctions
In some countries40 the consequences of an unauthorized disclosure of information
protected under mediation confidentiality amount to criminal sanctions. Probably,
most wide-known example of such regulation comes from Austria, where §31 (1) of
the Zivil-Mediations-Gesetz provides for imprisonment of up to 6 months for a breach
of the confidentiality duty.41
While mediation laws in most countries do not provide for such harsh penalties,
willful or negligent leaks of confidential information may potentially be subject to
sanctions under the general rules. For example, under German criminal law, a mis-
use of private information entrusted in confidence can be a punishable offense under
36See e.g. the Belgian Code judiciaire, Article 1728(1).
37Eidenmuller [7], p. 28.
38Matthews [15].
39Ch. Duve, Lessons learnt. . . , p. 7.
40Penal sanctions for a mediator or an expert who disregard their duty of confidentiality are provided e.g.
under Article 458 of the Code pénal in Belgium.
41§31(1) “Wer entgegen seiner Pflicht zur Verschwiegenheit und Vertraulichkeit (§18) Tatsachen offenbart
oder verwertet und dadurch ein berechtigtes Interesse einer Person verletzt, ist vom Gericht mit einer
Freiheitsstrafe bis zu sechs Monaten oder einer Geldstrafe bis zu 360 Tagessätzen zu bestrafen.”
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§203 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch—StGB). A criminal sanction may apply
to anyone who has received said information while employed inter alia as: a pro-
fessional psychologist, lawyer or tax accountant, or marriage or family counselor. If
members of these professions work as mediators specifically because of their exper-
tise (e.g. legal expertise for a lawyer, psychological expertise for a psychologist etc.),
§203 StGB applies to them.42
7 Exceptions to the confidentiality principle
The integrity of the mediation process requires that confidentiality provisions do not
provide safe-havens for participants’ wrongdoing or injustice.43 The principle of con-
fidentiality must not be absolute, and be subject to some exceptions. Their character
and reasoning differ.
7.1 Waiver
Many national regulations follow the rule that confidentiality may be waived by a
joint decision of the parties to mediation. This rule is prescribed, inter alia, in Arti-
cle 7(1) of the Directive (“unless the parties agree otherwise”). In consequence, even
if a mediator objects to giving evidence in subsequent juridical proceedings, but the
parties agree that the mediator should testify, he or she has no grounds to refuse to
give evidence under the Directive.
7.2 Enforcement of a mediation settlement
Likewise, there are a few controversies related to the exception that confidentiality
must be relieved to the extent it is necessary to enforce a mediation settlement.44
For example, under the UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 10(3): “(. . .) [confidential]
information may be disclosed or admitted in evidence (. . .) for the purposes of imple-
mentation or enforcement of a settlement agreement.” The EU Directive, Article 7(2),
identifies a similar exception “where disclosure of the content of the agreement result-
ing from mediation is necessary in order to implement or enforce that agreement.”45
7.3 Public policy exception and duty to report
The most problematic, but also most needed exception to the confidentiality principle
relates to the overriding interest of public policy. Confidentiality must be weighed
against the needs of public safety and security, and the protection of the most vital
interests of individuals.
42Ch. Duve, Lessons learnt . . . , p. 8, with references to legal writings in the field of criminal law.
43Alexander [1], p. 280.
44Deason [5].
45Similar regulations may be found e.g. in the Belgian Code judiciaire, Article 1728, or the Bulgarian
Mediation Law, Article 7(3)(3).
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According to the EU Directive, Article 7(2), confidentiality is relieved “where
this is necessary for overriding considerations of public policy of the Member State
concerned, in particular when required to ensure the protection of the best interests of
children or to prevent harm to the physical or psychological integrity of a person”.46
Several EU Member States decided that the general public policy exception would
be too vague and too broad, and its use could threaten the confidential nature of
mediation. Thus they did not include it at all, or replaced it with other narrowed
down exceptions. This group includes e.g. Belgium,47 Cyprus,48 Italy49 or Poland.
While finding a broader international consensus on acceptable exceptions to the
confidentiality principle impossible, the UNCITRAL Model Law leaves them to in-
dividual states: “[confidential] information may be disclosed or admitted in evidence
to the extent required under the law“ (Article 10(3)).
8 Conclusions
Confidentiality is one of the fundamental tenets of mediation. It encourages the can-
did flow of information in frank and open discussions. It is almost a truism that the ef-
fectiveness of mediation depends on participation with openness and candor.50 There-
fore the mediation practice needs the safeguards of confidentiality. They must be real
and adequate. Human nature dictates that people talk to others despite obligations of
confidentiality. More often than not breaches of confidentiality do not have significant
consequences. However, when they do, adequate legal remedies should be available.
There may be something more than just a coincidence in the observation that in
those jurisdictions where mediation practice is best developed, strict legal safeguards
of confidentiality are in place. For example, California’s mediation confidentiality
provisions, codified in the California Evidence Code (CEC), are known for their
strictness. Very few exceptions to confidentiality exist, and those that do are con-
sistently narrowly construed.51
Meanwhile, the EU Directive provides for a minimum degree of compatibility and
very basic standards. It addresses a single issue of the evidentiary restriction to forbid
hearing a mediator as a witness in a potential subsequent litigation or arbitration.
However, real dangers for confidentiality originate elsewhere. A number of relevant
issues are left beyond the ambit of the Directive, such as disclosures outside the scope
of litigation, duties of not only the mediator but also the parties and other participant
to the mediation process, and available remedies in case of unauthorized disclosure.
46See e.g. the Bulgarian Mediation Law, Article 7(3)(1) and (2).
47Verougstraete [22].
48The 2011 Cyprus Mediation Bill, Sect. 26.
49Marinari [14].
50New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Alternative Dispute Resolution—Training and Accredi-
tation of Mediators, Report No. 67, 1991, p. 63, http://www.lawreform.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/
lrc/documents/pdf/report_67.pdf.
51Peterson [17]. See also Callahan [4], p. 64. The pro-confidentiality approach has been confirmed by the
Californian courts, for example in California Supreme Court’s decision in Cassel v. Superior Court, 179
Cal. App. 4th 152.
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The legal regime is not strengthened by stricter protections arising from the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law. The Model Law has been implemented in (or significantly influ-
enced) just a handful of European countries. Therefore national mediation laws in
Europe are currently developing at a different pace and in different directions, adopt-
ing different standards regarding confidentiality protection. Arguably, such problems
could and should be remedied by more efforts towards harmonization.
In cross-border disputes, the legal situation is by definition complex. A clash of
different standards resulting from the interplay of two or more legal systems, such as
the laws of countries where the parties originate from, the law applicable to the sub-
ject matters dealt with in mediation, the law applicable to the mediation process itself
etc., leads to lack of coherence, uncertainty and divergent, often incidental results.
For example, in the event of an unauthorized disclosure to an outsider other than a
court, such as a market competitor, the legal consequences of such actions would
differ significantly among the EU Member States.
The need for a more coherent approach to regulating confidentiality in mediation
was already expressed in the European Parliament Resolution of 13 September 2011
on the implementation of the directive on mediation in the Member States, its impact
on mediation and its take up by the courts.52 Thus far, however, no initiative in this
respect has been undertaken. If the problem is not remedied, we may soon find our-
selves in a situation similar to the one which existed in the United States, when the
Uniform Mediation Act was enacted in 2001. At that time, there were more than 300
state statutes throughout the US providing some form of protection of confidentiality.
The UMA was an attempt to create some uniformity in this area.
Sooner or later the mediation practice in Europe may face similar problems. The
need for further harmonization to establish higher standards and greater clarity is
already apparent.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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